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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
that the loss or destruction, if any, was not caused by the
gross negligence of, or theft by, himself or employees." 21
It is submitted that the Washington Supreme Court, in the
Goodwin case correctly interpreted the statute in its true meaning.
However, the legislature, by the Act of 1933, placed the State of
Washington in a unique position as regards the liability of inn-
keepers. It is doubtful whether the legislature wished to or in-
tended to take such an extreme turn from the common law as is
taken in the Act of 1933. Under the normal statute few cases ever
reached the courts because the statute clearly set forth the liabili-
ties of the innkeeper and he knew that in certain cases he had to
pay. On the other hand under the Act of 1933, an interpreted by
the court, there is grave possibility of increased litigation, for the
innkeeper may now hide behind the statute to avoid the conse-
quences of his own negligence. 22
GEORGE 14. 'MARTIN.
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE LAW OF SISTER STATES
UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
A year ago in the case of State v. Johnson1 the court approved
the admission in evidence of certified photostatic copies of finger-
print records from penitentiaries of Oregon and California to prove
the identity of the defendant as a prior inmate of those institu-
tions. The court relied on a federal statute2 which, under authority
of Article IV, § 1, of the Federal Constitution,3 sets forth the pro-
cedure for certification of records that was followed in that case.
The statute further provides that when such procedure shall have
been followed,
"the said records and exemplifications, so authenticated,
shall have such faith and credit given to them in every
court and office within the United States as they have by
law or usage in the courts or offices of the state, territory,
or country, as aforesaid, from which they are taken."
It therefore became necessary for the court to investigate the
"See Watt v. Kilbury, 53 Wash. 446, 102 Pac. 403 (1909); Gillett v.
Waldorf Hotel Co., 136 Wash. 615, 241 Pac. 14 (1925); Davis v. Cohen, 253
Mich. 330, 235 N. W. 173 (1931).
'In handing down the decision in the Georgian Hotel case the court
pointed out with approval a statement of the New York Court of Appeals
in the case of Milhiser v. Beau Site Co., in which that court reversed a
lower court decision interpreting the New York statute in the same manner
as the Washington statute has been interpreted, and in which the court
said: "Such a holding by this court would nullify the purpose of the statute
and be in conflict with the spirit and intent thereof." The Washington
statute is copied from the New York statute of 1897, and, with the excep-
tion of the final clause in the act, follows the present New York law very
closely.
1194 Wash. 438, 78 P. (2d) 561 (1938).
IREv. STAT. § 906 (1875), 28 U. S. C. 688 (1934).
"'Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the congress
may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records,
and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof."
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laws or usages' of the Oregon and California courts to de-
termine whether or not those courts admitted in evidence photo-
static copies of fingerprint records for identification purposes;
this the court did by citing a case in point from each jurisdiction:
"The courts of California and Oregon have approved
the introduction in evidence of copies of fingerprints for
the purpose of identifying individuals accused of crime.
State v. Smith, 128 Ore. 515, 273 Pac. 323; People v.
Purcell, -___ Cal ..... '70 P. (2) 706."
Thus the court took judicial notice of the law of a sister state
in seeming contradiction to the well settled rule that a court will
not judicially notice the law of a foreign jurisdiction.4
The state did not attempt to prove as a part of its case in chief
that copies of fingerprint records were admissible in California
and Oregon courts for identification purposes, nor did the court
in any way attempt to justify its action in noticing the law of
those states. The problem of finding some valid basis or justifica-
tion for the action of the court is clearly presented.
The common method of handling a situation where the person
relying on the law of another state fails to plead and prove that
law is to assume or presume that the law of the other state is the
same as the law of the forum,5 and to proceed on that basis.' The
court could readily have followed such an approach in this case,
for fingerprint records are admissible in the courts of Washington
to show identity.7
'McDaniel v. Pressler, 3 Wash. 636, 29 Pac. 209 (1892); Lowry v. Moore,
16 Wash. 476, 48 Pac. 238, 58 Am. St. Rep. 49 (1897); in re Stewart's Estate,
26 Wash. 32, 66 Pac. 148, 67 Pac. 723 (1901); Ongaro v. Twohy, 49 Wash.
93, 94 Pac. 916 (1908); Martin Brothers v. Nettleton, 138 Wash. 102, 244
Pac. 386 (1926); Walnut Park Lumber & Coal Co. v. Roane, 171 Wash. 362,
17 P. (2d) 896 (1933). Cf. Rader v. Stubblefield, 43 Wash. 334, 350, 86 Pac.
560 (1906), and Rubin v. Dale, 156 Wash. 676, 288 Pac. 223 (1930).
"Yeaton v. Eagle Oil and Refining Co., 4 Wash. 183, 29 Pac. 1051 (1892);
Gunderson v. Gunderson, 25 Wash. 459, 65-Pac. 791 (1901); Daniel v. Gold
Hill Mining Co., 28 Wash. 411, 68 Pac. 884 (1902); Clark v. Elfinge, 29
Wash. 215, 69 Pac. 736 (1902); 38 Wash. 376, 80 Pac. 556, 107 Ama. St. Rep.
858 (1905); Mantle v. Dabney, 44 Wash. 193, 87 Pac. 122 (1906); Murrilla
v. Guis, 51 Wash. 93, 98 Pac. 100 (1908); Colpe v. Lindblom, 57 Wash. 106,
106 Pac. 634 (1910); Pitt v. Little, 58 Wash. 355, 108 Pac. 941 (1910); Shep-
pard v. Coeur d'Alene Lumber Co., 62 Wash. 12, 112 Pac. 932, 44 L. R. A.
(N. s) 267, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 909 (1911); German-American Bank of
Seattle v. Wright, 85 Wash. 460, 148 Pac. 769, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 381 (1915);
Plath v. Mullins, 87 Wash. 403, 151 Pac. 811 (1915); Marston v. Rue, 92
Wash. 129, 159 Pac. 111 (1916); Freyman v. Day, 108 Wash. 71, 182 Pac.
940 (1919); Williams v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 108 Wash. 344, 184 Pac.
340 (1919); Tatum v. Marsh Mines Consolidated, 108 Wash. 367, 184 Pac.
628 (1919); Wamsley v. Rostad, 150 Wash. 192, 272 Pac. 722 (1928); Lino
v. Hole, 159 Wash. 16, 291 Pac. 1079 (1930); Walnut Park Lumber & Coal
Co. v. Roane, 171 Wash. 362, 17 P. (2d) 896 (1933); Kales, Presumption of
the Foreign Law (1906), 19 Hazv. L. RPv. 401.
'The result of this presumption is to cast upon the opposing party the
burden of proving, if he wishes, that the law of the sister state is actually
different from the law of the forum. Whether this burden amounts to a
burden of persuasion or merely to a burden of going forward with the
evidence has not been decisively determined, although the court in Lino
v. Hole, 159 Wash. 16, 291 Pac. 1079 (1930), indicates that the presumption
may be overcome by "substantial" proof.
'State v. Bolen, 142 Wash. 653, 254 Pac. 445 (1927).
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Another basis on which the notice of the Oregon and California
laws may be sustained is found by analogy to the rule laid down in
the case of Trowbridge v. Spinning," subsequently followed in
two Washington cases.9 By the rule in these cases the court will
take judicial notice of the law of a sister state giving jurisdiction
to a court which rendered a judgment on which one of the parties
is relying. The three Washington cases involve records of judicial
proceedings only, and each raises the question of the jurisdiction
of the court which entered the judgment. The Johnson case, on
the other hand, deals with non-judicial records from penitentiaries
and raises a problem" of the effect of such records rather than any
question of jurisdiction. These two differences seem insufficient
to destroy the analogy,'0 for both cases are embraced within the
terms of the federal statute and the section of the United States
Constitution mentioned above; and the following language from
Trowbridge v. Spinning, supra, is likewise broad enough to cover
the situation of the Johnson case:
"Where a question arises under that part of the Consti-
tution of the United States and the act of Congress which
requires full faith and credit to be given in each state to
the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every
other state, our courts will take judicial notice of the
local laws of the state from which the record comes."
It should be mentioned also that Congress has treated judicial
and non-judicial records in nearly the same manner. 1'
The rule of Trowbridge v. Spinning, supra, is an established
exception in this and in other states to the general doctrine that
the court will not take judicial notice of the laws of sister states;
but an examination of the reasons behind this exception brings to
light a logical anomaly. The reasoning used to sustain the rule is
well stated in Ohio v. Hinchman," an authority relied on in the
Trowbridge case, as follows:
"A judgment of this court, adverse to the right arising
out of the Federal Constitution and legislation, would be
reviewable in the Supreme Court of the United States,
and there the states of the confederacy are not regarded as
foreign states, whose laws and usages must be proved,
but as domestic institutions, whose laws are to be noticed
without pleading or proof. It would be a very imperfect
and discordant administration for the court of original
123 Wash. 48, 62 Pac. 125, 83 Am. St. Rep. 806, 54 L. R. A. 204 (1900).
Dormitzer v. German Savings & Loan Soc., 23 Wash. 132, 62 Pac. 862
(1900), aff'd, 192 U. S. 125, 48 L. Ed. 373, 24 S. Ct. 221 (1904); Miller v.
Miller, 90 Wash. 333, 156 Pac. 8 (1916).31In Garigues v. Harris, 17 Pa. 344 (1851), the court used the reasoning
of Trowbridge v. Spinning, 23 Wash. 48, 62 Pac. 125, 83 Am. St. Rep. 806,
54 L. R. A. 204 (1900), to determine the effect in New Jersey of a recorded
abstract of a mortgage-a non-judicial record. In Paine v. Schnectady Ins.
Co., 11 R. I. 411 (1877), a case cited in Trowbridge v. Spinning, supra, the
reasoning of Ohio v. Hinchman, 27 Pa. 479 (1856), was relied upon to
determine the effect of certain judicial records from a sister state.
"Compare 28 U. S. C. § 688 with 28 U. S. C. § 687.
'"27 Pa. 479 (1856).
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jurisdiction to adopt one rule of decision, while the court
of final resort was governed by another; and hence it fol-
lows, that in questions of this sort, we should take notice
-of the local laws of a sister state in the same manner the
Supreme Court of the United States would do on a writ
of error to our judgment."
In 1856, when Ohio v. Hinhman. was decided, this argument was
reasonably persuasive because there had been no definitive state-
ment on the point,13 but in 1885, the United States Supreme Court
in Hanley v. Donoghue'4 expressly rejected the reasoning used in
this ease and in Paine v. Schenectady Insurance Co.," another
ease cited as authority in Trowbridge v. Spinning, in these words:
".... whenever it becames necessary for a court of one
state, in order to give full faith and credit to a judgment
rendered in another state, to ascertain the effect which it
has in that state, the law of that state must be proved,
like any other matter of fact.
"The opposing decisions in Ohio v. Hinchman, 27 Pa.
St. 479 and Paine v. Schenectady Ins. Co., 11 R. I. 411,
are based upon the misapprehension that this court, on
a writ of error to review a decision of the highest court
of one state upon the faith and credit to be allowed to a
judgment rendered in another state, always takes notice
of the laws of the latter state; ...
"But in this court, exercising an appellate jurisdiction,
whatever was matter of law in the court appealed from is
matter of law here; and whatever was matter of fact in
the court appealed from is matter of fact here."6
Although Hanley v. Donoghue was fifteen years old when Trow-
bridge v. Spinning was decided in 1900, the court in the latter
case apparently overlooked the Supreme Court decision and relied
instead upon the two cases expressly disapproved in Hanley v.
Donoghue.
In the Trowbridge ease and the two subsequent Washington
cases there was actually no necessity for the court to take judicial
notice of the laws of the sister state to determine whether or not
"Contra: Thomas v. Robinson, 45 N. Y. 267 (1829); Pelton v. Platner,
13 Ohio 209, 42 Am. Dec. 197 (1844), where the court expressly refused to
take judicial notice of the laws of a sister state to determine the jurisdic-
tion of the court from which the record issued: "This court is not bound
to take notice, ex officio, of the laws of other states, and it is no enviable
task to keep pace with the Solons of our own. When a question depends
on the laws of a sister state,' in our courts, such laws are a part of the
evidence in the case, and, like another fact, must be proved by him who
holds the affirmative . . . If such judgments bind property in Michigan,
we would give them the same effect here . . . but before the courts
here can give them any such effect, the law-of Michigan must be proved."
"116 U. S. 1, 29 L. Ed. 535, 6 S. Ct. 242 (1885).
3111 R. I. 411 (1877).
This case has been followed in Chicago & Alton Ry. v. Wiggins Ferry
Co., 119 U. S. 615, 30 L. Ed. 519, 7 S. Ct. 398 (1886); Huntington v. Attril,
146 U. S. 657, 36 L. Ed. 1123, 13 S. Ct. 224 (1892); Lloyd v. Matthews, 155
U. S. 222, 39 L. Ed. 128, 15 S. Ct 70 (1894). Accord: Renaud v. Abbott,
116 U. S. 277, 29 L. Ed. 629, 6 S. Ct. 1194 (1885).
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the court of that state had sufficient jurisdiction to render the
judgment, for in each of the threer cases there was an allegation
by the party relying on the judgment in the sister state that the
court which had rendered the judgment was a court of general
jurisdiction. Such an allegation will be sufficient under a wel set-
tled rule to raise a presumption that the court which originally
issued the judgment had jurisdiction of the subject matter of
the case and of the parties. This rule of presumption has been
widely applied in several variationsT and was recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Hanley v. Donoghue,
supra, itself :
17A few cases indicate that the court of the sister state which issued
the judgment will be presumed to have had jurisdiction of the subject
matter and of the parties merely from the fact that the record of that
judgment has been admitted in evidence. Welch v. Sykes, 8 Ill 208, 3
Gilman 197, 44 Am. Dec. 689 (1846); Rae v. Hulbert, 17 Ill. 572, 577 (1856);
Shumway v. Stillman, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 292, 15 Am. Dec. 374 (1825); Baxley
v. Linah, 16 Pa. 241 (1851); Clark v. Eltinge, 38 Wash. 376, 80 Pac. 556,
107 Am. St. Rep. 858 (1905).
But the majority rule requires the proponent to allege or the face of
the record to show that the judgment was rendered by a court of generaljurisdiction in order to raise the presumption of jurisdiction. Hanley v.
Donoghue, 116 U. S. 1, 29 L. Ed. 535, 6 S. Ct. 242 (1885); Bimeler v. Daw-
son, 5 Ill. 554, 4 Scammon 536, 39 Am. Dec. 430 (1843); Rape v. Heaton, 9
Wis. 301 (1859); Jarvis v. Robinson, 21 Wis. 530, 94 Am. Dec. 560 (1867);
Kunze v. Kunze, 94 Wis. 54, 68 N. W. 391, 59 Am. St. Rep. 857 (1896).
Compare McLaughlin v. Nichols, 13 Abb. (N. Y.) 244 (1861), where the
court dismissed the action for failure to allege that the court was one
of general jurisdiction, with Foot v. Stevens, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 483 (1837),
where the court was very lenient in finding an allegation of general
jurisdiction.
A few courts, erroneously interpreting Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch 481,
3 L. Ed. 411 (1813), and Hampton v. M'Connel, 3 Wheat. 234, 4 L. Ed. 378
(1818), have held the judgments of sister states conclusive on the parties
and not subject to any type of attack. Napier v. Gidiere, 1 Spear's Equity(S. C.) 215, 40 Am. Dec. 613 (1843); Wheeler v. Raymond, 8 Cow. (N. Y.)
311 (1828).
Most courts, however, allow the presumption of jurisdiction of the
court over the parties to be rebutted. Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U. S.
457, 21 L. Ed. 897 (1874); Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 47 L. Ed.
366, 23 S. Ct. 237 (1902); German Savings and Loan Society v. Dormitzer,
192 U. S. 125, 48 L. Ed. 373, 25 S. Ct. 221 (1904); Bimeler v. Dawson, 5 Dl.
554, 4 Scammon 536, 39 Am. Dec. 430 (1843); Bartlet v. Knight, 1 Mass. 401,
2 Am. Dec. 36 (1805); Long v. Long, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 597 (1841); McLure
v. Benceni, 2 Iredell's Equity (N. C.) -513, 40 N. C. 437 (1843); Rape v.
Heaton, 9 Wis. 301 (1859); Jarvis v. Robinson, 21 Wis. 530, 94 Am. Dec.
560 (1867). And correlatively some sourts have allowed the defendant
to rebut the presumed authorization of the attorney alleged in the record
to have appeared for him. Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380, 10 Am. Dec.
151 (1822); Welch v. Sykes, 8 Il. 208, 3 Gilman 197, 44 Am. Dec. 689 (1846).
Some courts attempt to make a distinction between courts of -generaljurisdiction and courts of special jurisdiction, requiring in the latter case
that the state statutes .which provide for the jurisdiction of the court
which issued the judgment be proven as facts. Gay v. Lloyd, 1 G. Greene
(Iowa) 78, 46 Am. Dec. 499 (1847). But the Washington court in Trow-
,bridge v. Spinning, 23 Wash. 48 62 Pac. 125, 83 Am. St. Rep. 806, 54 L. R.A. 204 (1900), relying on Kunze v. Kunze,- supra, rejected the distinction
on the ground.that .the presumption. of jurisdiction throws th burden- of
proof on the opponent in. all. eases.-:- - .
A few courts repudiate -the: presumption doctrine and the -judicial
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".... a record of a judgment so authenticated doubt-
less proves itself without further evidence; and if it ap-
pears upon its face to be a record of a court of general
jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the court over the cause
and the parties is to be presumed unless disproved by
extrinsic evidence or by the record itself."
The Wisconsin court has reached the solution here suggested.
On the one hand it has refused to take judicial notice of the law
of the sister state to determine jurisdiction,18 while on the other
hand it has recognized the rule which raises a presumption of
jurisdiction from the allegation that the court was a court of
general jurisdiction.19 This solution seems to be the best, in that
it is consistent with the orthodox interpretation of the cases arising
under the full faith and credit clause; and still it reaches the de-
sired end.
Of course the judicial notice taken in the case of State v. John-
son, supra, could not be justified on this rule of presumption, for
the question there is one of the effect to be given certain records
rather than any question of jurisdiction. The Johnson case may be
supported by analogy to the rule of the Trowbridge case; but
it is submitted that that case is of doubtful validity.
Wigmore's comment on the whole problem of judicial notice
of foreign law is interesting:
"All the foregoing quiddities are thoroughly unprac-
tical. The judges manipulate an esoteric logical dream-
machine which has caused them to forget the world of
reality. Judicial power should be used to get at the faes
more directly and candidly."'°
This criticism is especially applicable to the rule which pre-
vents a state court from taking judicial notice of the laws of a
sister state. Correction of the rule, however, should come by way
of legislation, rather than by sporadic judicial decisions, to the
end of developing a uniform practice of judicial notice of foreign
law.
21
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notice doctrine of Trowbridge v. Spinning, supra, altogether, holding. that
n all cases the proponent must prove the jurisdiction of the court ren-
dering the judgment as a fact. Gebhard v. Gamier, 75 Ky. 321, 23 Am.
Rep. 721 (1876); Pelton v. Platner, 13 Ohio 209, 42 Aim Dec. 197 (1844).
"Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 301 (1859); Walsh v. Dart, 12 Wis. 709 (1860).
"Jarvis v. Robinson, 21 Wis. 530, 94 Am. Dec. 560 (1867); Kunze v.
Kunze, 94 Wis. 54, 68 N. W. 391, 59 Am. St. Rep. 857 (1896).
05 WirasmoR, EvmENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2573.
nWimoPE, EvmiENcE, § 2573 (Supp. 1934); "Uniform Judicial Notice of
Foreign Law Act," Handbook of the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings .p. 355 (1936).
